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DRAFT

23 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Repercussions, etc.

REFERENCES: (a) SNIE 10-2-66: REACTIONS TO A POSSIBLE US COURSE
OF ACTION (17 March 1966)

(b) Memorandum for the Director: "Reactions to . . ."
(17 June 1966)

1. Reference (a) concluded that successful OXCART operations over mainland China would probably not be publicized by the Chinese Communists, but that they would try to destroy the aircraft, and that if it came down on Chinese territory (especially with a live American pilot) they would launch a major propaganda campaign. The SNIE ~~is~~ also pointed out that mere deployment of the aircraft to Okinawa would soon become known and might be publicized by the Japanese or US press.

2. Reference (b) emphasized that the timing of an OXCART reconnaissance program would have a bearing on the degree of reaction of the Chinese, and of the world at large.

3. One of the times when it would be relatively disadvantageous to have the OXCART program come to light would be the early days of the forthcoming UN General Assembly session. The Assembly will meet on 20 September . . . etc.

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

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SUBJECT: Repercussions in the UN of OXCART deployment to Okinawa
or use over South China

~~1. The UN General Assembly will meet on 20 September, and one of~~
its first items of business will be the annual consideration of Chinese
membership. As always, maintenance of the US position on this matter
will be a difficult and complicated business, and it could be made
more difficult by any appreciable international agitation which might
arise over OXCART deployment or use. It is possible that, in the
context of the UN meeting, Communist or neutralist powers might choose
to make more of an issue over OXCART deployment to Okinawa, or over
Publicized
~~detected~~ OXCART overflights of China, than we have estimated they
would. They might hope thereby to influence the Assembly's actions
on Chinese membership.

~~4. We are not in a position to judge what votes in the Assembly~~
~~might be changed by such tactics.~~ As a general proposition, we con-
tinue to believe that the amount of international feeling which would
be aroused by propaganda concerning deployment would not be great.
~~Nevertheless, it might have some impact on UN deliberations.~~

~~3. As we observed in our basic estimate (SNIE 10-2-66)~~ *is noted above,*
loss of
an OXCART vehicle over China, especially if the pilot were captured


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25X1

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
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alive, would be the occasion for a major political and propaganda
campaign, ^{which might} ~~This would certainly affect UN deliberations on Chinese~~
~~membership, and might seriously embarrass the US in upholding its~~
position. 

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